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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 910494

v.
STEVEN DOUGLAS THURMAN,

Category No. 11

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This interlocutory appeal is from the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized in a
search of a storage unit leased to defendant.
The Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (Supp. 1991).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review:
1.

Did the trial court correctly reject defendant's

claim that the search warrant affidavit did not support the
magistrate's determination of probable cause due to allegedly
stale information?
When a search warrant is challenged as having been
issued without probable cause, the reviewing court does not
conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's determination of
probable cause; rather, the reviewing court simply looks to see
whether the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for determining
that probable cause existed.

The reviewing court must pay great

deference to the magistrate's decision.

State v. Babbell, 770

P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989).
2.

Did the trial court correctly rule admissible the

evidence seized from defendant's storage unit pursuant to
consents to a search of that unit given by defendant after police
misconduct?
Under State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), the
state must show that a consent to search obtained after police
misconduct was both voluntary and not a product of police
exploitation of the prior illegality.

The trial court's

determinations on the issues of voluntariness and exploitation
are findings of fact reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990); People v.
Williams, 8 Cal.App.3d 44, 86 Cal.Rptr. 821, 824 (1970).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with first degree murder, a
capital felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(1) (Supp.
1991); delivering an infernal machine, a second degree felony,
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-307 (1990); and construction of an
infernal machine, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann.
S 76-10-308 (1990) (R. 7-9).
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, which
2

the trial court denied (R. 27-28, 67-81).

This Court granted

defendant's petition for permission to appeal the suppression
ruling (R. 103).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
After hearing evidence on defendant's motion to
suppress, the trial court made the following findings of fact1:
The defendant is charged with a capital
homicide and two related felonies. The
Information alleges that defendant caused the
death of Adam Cook by means of a bomb which
was detonated on the night of May 15, 1991.
On the night following the bombing incident,
U.S. Magistrate Ronald Boyce issued a warrant
to search defendant's apartment. The
application for the search warrant requested
authorization to enter defendant's apartment
without giving notice ("no-knock•• entry) and
at any time of the day or night. The warrant
issued, however, restricted the search to the
hours between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. and
did not authorize a "no-knock1' entry.
The basis for the warrant was the
affidavit of Roderic J. Conner, a Special
Agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco &
Firearms ("ATF"). All the information
contained in the affidavit appears to have
been developed in the days and hours
following the May 15 bombing.
Assuming the accuracy of the Conner
affidavit and the hearsay statements therein,
the following facts supporting the issuance
of the warrant were submitted to Magistrate
1

In his brief, defendant sets out a statement of facts
drawn primarily from his independent reading of the transcript of
the evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress (Br. of
Appellant at 2-5). However, because defendant does not challenge
the trial court's findings of fact as clearly erroneous, see
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) (the factual
findings underlying the trial court's ruling on a motion to
suppress will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly
erroneous), the court's findings are the facts this Court must
accept for purposes of review.

3

Boyce: A bomb was placed in an automobile
belonging to Howard Cook and was detonated on
May 15, 1991, injuring Mr. Cook's son, Adam.
Mr. Cook had been having an affair with
defendant's former wife, Wendy Thurman. The
affair spanned the period before and after
the Thurman divorce. As recent [sic] as May
13, Cook had spent the night at Wendy
Thurman's residence. The defendant was aware
of the affair between Mr. Cook and his former
wife. The defendant reported this affair to
Mr. Cook's then wife and asked her if she
intended to allow Mr. Cook to continue to
reside in the Cook house. While defendant
had made no threats directly to his former
wife, on at least one occasion several months
before the bombing incident he sat in his car
in the early morning hours outside his former
wife's apartment and observed his former wife
and Mr. Cook returning from a date.
Defendant had expressed his anger toward and
hatred for his former wife and indicated he
had hired a private investigator to watch her
and Mr. Cook. On the morning of May 14, a
male caller to Metz Bakery, an establishment
where both Mr. Cook and defendant's former
wife were employed, stated that there was a
bomb in one of the trucks. The Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Office investigated but
found no bomb. On the day of the bombing,
May 15, Mr. Cook's automobile was parked in
the Metz Bakery parking lot from 6:00 a.m. to
4:00 p.m. At the time of the bombing, Mr.
Cook's automobile was parked in front of the
Richard Craig residence located at 5740 South
665 West in Murray. A neighbor of the
Craig's observed a small two-door vehicle
leave the area at a high rate of speed and
with its lights out. The Affidavit does not,
however, specify the date or time when the
neighbor made this observation. The
defendant drives a Chevrolet Monza.
(Affidavit of Roderic J. Conner, paras. 2-4,
6-10, 12).
At 6:14 a.m. on May 17, 1991, the day
following the issuance of the warrant and two
days following the bombing, seven law
enforcement officers executed the warrant.
Six of the officers forced their way into
defendant's apartment with weapons drawn less
4

than 30 seconds after knocking.2 The ATF
agent in charge of entry testified that the
officers announced their identity and intent
simultaneously with their entry. Defendant
was in bed, asleep, naked and offering no
resistance when he was subdued and handcuffed
by the officers. In the process, defendant
was cut on the nose and attended to by
paramedics on the scene. The evidence does
not indicate whether the paramedics were
summoned out of concern for the officers'
liability or the defendant's well-being. The
paramedics treated defendant and he was
allowed to dress at some time before 7:30
a.m. and perhaps as early as 6:30. Defendant
was initially informed of his rights in
accordance with the decision in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) soon after the
officers' entry but before he was treated by
the paramedics and allowed to dress.
At 7:30 a.m. defendant signed two consent
forms granting consent to search two
automobiles and a camper. ATF Agent Robert
Swehla read the consent form verbatim to
defendant. As the search at defendant's
residence proceeded, the officers became
aware of a storage unit which defendant
rented. At 7:40 a.m. defendant signed
another consent form authorizing a
generalized search of the storage unit.
Defendant fully understood the three consents
before signing. His own testimony indicated
that he was not compelled or coerced to sign.
There is a conflict in the evidence whether
an officer suggested that defendant's failure
to cooperate and sign the consent would not
ultimately prohibit a search. The court
specifically finds that an officer made that

2

The court did not specify how many seconds, less than
thirty, elapsed between the knock on the door and the entry.
Agent Roderic Conner, who was not standing at the door when the
entry was made but who heard the knock and entry from his
position in the parking lot of defendant's residence, testified
that the time between the entry and the knock on the door was
M
[h]alf a minute, maybe" (R. 141-42). He believed the occupant
of the residence was afforded an opportunity to respond to the
knock (R. 142). Conner gave the only testimony regarding the
time period between the knock and the entry.
5

suggestion but that it was not Agent Swehla.
It was Swehla, however, who was in charge of
acquiring these consents. It should be noted
that the consents were signed 75-85 minutes
following entry and after defendant dressed,
called his employer, was treated by the
paramedics and informed of his constitutional
right to counsel and right to remain silent.
Between approximately 8:30 a.m. and 9:30
a.m., an officer again informed defendant of
his rights under the Miranda decision. At
11:00 a.m. defendant accompanied the officers
to the storage unit and defendant again
signed a general consent to search the
storage unit at 11:29 a.m. ATF Agent Conner
went over the consent form with defendant
point by point before he signed the form.
Defendant understood the consent and
testified himself that his signature was not
coerced. He also understood that the form
was similar to that which he previously
signed for Agent Swehla.
[T]he search of the storage unit proceeded
at about 12:30 or 1:00 p.m
Defendant was handcuffed throughout the
various searches with the exception of a
total of 20 minutes to one hour at the
storage unit and in transit.3 Defendant was
not formally arrested until 2:30 p.m. There
can be no doubt, however, that defendant was
in custody since 6:14 a.m.
Memorandum Decision and Order (hereafter "Order") at 1-6 (R. 6772) (a copy of the court's entire decision is contained in
Appendix A ) .
Based on the foregoing factual findings, the court
denied defendant's motion to suppress, holding first that certain
information in the affidavit supporting the search warrant was
not stale, and thus the warrant was properly issued upon the
3

Agent Conner testified that defendant was handcuffed for
safety reasons only (R. 125, 130).

6

affidavit which, viewed in its entirety, established probable
cause to believe relevant evidence was in defendant's apartment.
However, the court ruled that the officers executed the warrant
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(1) (1990) when, without
"no-knock" authorization, they "made a mere perfunctory knock and
seconds later made a forced entry" and conducted a search.

It

then went on to hold that despite the officers' noncompliance
with section 77-23-10(1), the evidence found in the storage unit
was admissible as fruit of a search conducted pursuant to
defendant's valid consent under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684
(Utah 1990).

Order at 7-13 (R. 73-79).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

First, the trial court correctly concluded that the
magistrate had a substantial basis for determining that probable
cause existed for the issuance of the search warrant for
defendant's residence.

Contrary to defendant's contention, the

affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause and was not
rendered inadequate due to allegedly stale information.
Mere passage of time does not necessarily invalidate
the basis for a warrant; rather, the affidavit must be read in a
common sense fashion to assess whether the dated information
still has the capacity to establish a fair probability that
evidence of a crime would be found in a particular place.
Here the information defendant challenges as stale,
although dated, served to establish defendant's motive and
opportunity to commit the bombing.
7

Other challenged information

simply cannot be characterized as stale, in that it related to
events close to or at the time of the bombing.
Second, the trial court correctly ruled admissible the
evidence seized from defendant's storage unit pursuant to his
consent to a search of that unit.

Contrary to defendant's

argument, the record supports the court's determination that
defendant's consents to the search were voluntary and not
obtained by exploitation of prior police misconduct.
Defendant fails to show that the trial court's factual
findings of voluntary consent and no police exploitation are
clearly erroneous.

In reaching its findings, the court properly

focused primarily on the voluntariness of defendant's consent in
light of the prior police misconduct.

This approach reflects the

most reasonable interpretation of the two-part test adopted in
State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REJECTED
DEFENDANT'S ALLEGATION THAT THE SEARCH
WARRANT AFFIDAVIT CONTAINED FATALLY STALE
INFORMATION, AND CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
MAGISTRATE HAD A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR ITS
DETERMINATION THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED.
The trial court correctly concluded that the magistrate
had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause
existed for the issuance of the search warrant for defendant's
residence.

Contrary to defendant's contention, the affidavit was

sufficient to establish probable cause, and was not rendered

8

inadequate due to allegedly stale information/
When a search warrant is challenged as having been
issued without probable cause, the reviewing court does not
conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's determination of
probable cause; rather, to uphold the warrant, the reviewing
court must simply conclude that the magistrate had a "substantial
basis" for determining that probable cause existed.
Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989).

State v.

In conducting its

examination, the reviewing court "should consider a search
warrant affidavit 'in its entirety and in a common-sense
fashion.'"

Ibid. (quoting State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102

(Utah 1985)). "Finally, the reviewing court should pay 'great
deference' to the magistrate's decision."

Ibid, (citing Illinois

v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)).
With respect to an allegation that a search warrant
affidavit contains stale information, mere passage of time does
not necessarily invalidate the basis for a warrant; rather, the
affidavit must still be read in a common sense fashion to assess
whether the dated information still has the capacity to establish
a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found in a
particular place.

See State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah

A

Defendant analyzes the issues raised on appeal solely
under federal constitutional law; he does not treat them
separately under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
Therefore, the State will not address the question of whether the
analysis would be different under the state constitution. See
State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1988) ("As a general
rule, we will not engage in a state constitutional analysis
unless an argument for different analyses under the state and
federal constitutions are briefed.").

9

1987) (per curiam); State v. Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah
App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).

In short,

H

[t]he test for staleness of information contained in a search

warrant affidavit is a common sense test of determining if the
facts are sufficient to justify a conclusion by a neutral
magistrate that the property sought is still on the person or
premises to be searched."

State v. Bohannon, 62 Wash.App. 462,

814 P.2d 694, 698 (1991) (citations omitted).

And, "'whether

information is too stale to establish probable cause depends on
the nature of the criminal activity, the length of the activity,
and the nature of the property seized.'"

United States v.

Williams, 897 F.2d 1034, 1039 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting United
States v. Shomo, 786 F.2d 981, 984 (10th Cir. 1986)), cert.
denied. 111 S. Ct. 2064 (1991).
Defendant challenges as impermissibly stale the
following information in the affidavit supporting the search
warrant:

(1) defendant hated the victim's father because he was

having an extramarital affair with defendant's former wife before
defendant and his former wife were divorced; (2) statements were
made by defendant's former wife and her aunt regarding incidents
with defendant which occurred several months before the
bombing5; (3) a neighbor in the area of the bombing claimed to
5

Presumably, defendant is referring to the following two
paragraphs in the affidavit:
9. On May 16, 1991, Jeff Anderson and I
interviewed Wendy Thurman [defendant's former
wife]. She said that Steve [defendant] would
not talk to her after the divorce and had not
10

have seen a small, two-door vehicle without its lights on speed
away from the area; and (4) on May 14, 1991, a male called the
victim's father's employer to say that a bomb was in one of the
latter's trucks, but the police found no bomb.

Br. of Appellant

at 14-15. However, defendant fails to explain why this
information was stale at the time it was submitted to the
magistrate, or why the trial court was incorrect in concluding
that "[m]erely because much of the information recited in the
supporting affidavit disclosed matters occurring months before is
of no great significance[;] [s]uch facts were for the purpose of
showing that defendant had the motive and opportunity to commit
the crime and that his apartment was thus an appropriate place to
search," Order at 8 (R. 74). Defendant merely contends that the
passage of time affected the vitality of the information.
made any threats against her. Wendy said
that she and Howard [the victim's father]
came to her house at about 1:30 a.m. after a
date several months ago and saw Steve Thurman
in his car parked near the apartment watching
them. . . •
10. On May 16, 1991, Jeff Anderson and I
interviewed Linda Mae Bird, the Aunt [sic] of
Wendy Thurman, who said that she had received
a telephone call from Steve Thurman about six
months ago and he told her he had hired a
private investigator to watch Howard and
Wendy. Mrs. Bird said that Steve was
extremely angry at Wendy because of the
divorce and said that he hates Wendy for it.
Mrs. Bird said that Steve knew where Howard
parked his Landcruiser when he was visiting
Wendy at her residence and he had photos of
them together.
Affidavit of Roderic J. Conner (State's Exhibit 1-S) (a copy of
the entire affidavit is contained in Appendix B).
11

The information concerning events that had occurred
months before the issuance of the warrant established that
defendant was extremely angiry about the affair between his former
wife and the victim's father, and that he had taken steps to
monitor the relationship.

No evidence was presented that

defendant's anger had dissipated by the time the warrant was
issued.

Indeed, a common sense reading of the affidavit suggests

defendant's continuing anger throughout the period leading up to
the date of the bombing.

Cf.. Hansen, 732 P.2d at 131 ("[A]

common-sense reading of th[e] affidavit suggested the continuing
nature of the drug's presence.").

Thus, the trial court

correctly concluded that the statements pertaining to defendant's
mental state (i.e., those given by his former wife and her aunt)
were not stale.

The statements were relevant to establishing

that defendant had the motive and opportunity to commit the
bombing for a substantial period prior to its occurrence, and
therefore contributed to the creation of probable cause to
believe there was evidence of the crime at defendant's apartment.
Although the statement in the affidavit that a neighbor
in the area of the bombing had seen a small vehicle speed away
without its lights on is not anchored with a specific date6,
6

The affidavit reads:
12. On May 16, 1991, Detective Hall of
Murray, Utah Police Department who [sic] told
me that he interviewed Diane Burbidge who is
a neighbor of the Craig's. She said that she
saw a small 2 door vehicle leaving the area
Eastbound [sic] at a high rate of speed with
its lights out.
12

when read in a common sense fashion that statement obviously
refers to the time of the bombing.

Admittedly, this should have

been clearly stated in the affidavit, but it was within the
discretion of the magistrate to reasonably construe the ambiguous
statement as referring to the time of the bombing.
P.2d at 992.

Babbell, 770

See also State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1259-61

(Utah 1983) (absence in affidavit of date of informant's
observation and receipt of information not fatal; "affidavit in
the instant case, couched as it is in present-tense language
which describes on-going criminal activity, clearly refutes any
contention that it is based on stale information").
Finally, the information regarding a bomb threat
received by the victim's father's employer on May 14, 1991, just
one day before the bombing and but two days before the warrant
was issued, could not be considered stale.
In sum, the trial court properly applied the highly
deferential standards of review in examining the magistrate's
determination of probable cause.

It correctly rejected

defendant's staleness argument in favor of the conclusion that
the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that there
was a fair probability evidence of the crime would be in
defendant's apartment.

The officers had a valid search warrant.

Affidavit of Roderic J. Conner (State's Exhibit 1-S) (Appendix
B).
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED STATE V.
ARROYO, 796 P.2D 684 (UTAH 1990), IN FINDING
THAT DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO A SEARCH OF HIS
STORAGE UNIT, WHICH WAS RECEIVED AFTER POLICE
MISCONDUCT, WAS VOLUNTARY AND NOT OBTAINED BY
EXPLOITATION OF THE MISCONDUCT; ITS FINDINGS
HAVE SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT IN THE RECORD.
The trial court correctly ruled admissible the evidence
seized from defendant's storage unit pursuant to his consents to
a search of the unit*

Contrary to defendant's argument, the

record supports the court's determination that defendant's
consents to the search were voluntary and not obtained by
exploitation of prior police misconduct.
Having determined the officers had a valid warrant, the
trial court then considered whether the execution of the warrant
was lawful.

It concluded that the officers' entry into

defendant's residence, while authorized by the valid warrant,
violated Utah's "knock-and-announce" statute, Utah Code Ann. §
77-23-10 (1990).

The court noted that under State v. Rowe, 806

P.2d 730 (Utah App.) (holding that violation of Utah's nighttime
search statute —

Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1) (1990) —

requires

suppression), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), the
violation of section 77-23-10 would justify suppression of any
evidence found in the search of the apartment.

However, the

court held that because no incriminating evidence was found
there7, the unlawful entry need only be considered in deciding
7

Defendant contends that in reaching this conclusion,
'[t]he court overlooked that a pay envelope to [defendant]'s
storage unit was found." Br. of Appellant at 10. However, the
14

whether, under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), it
invalidated defendant's subsequent consents to the search of his
storage unit, where all the incriminating evidence was found.
Order at 9-10 (R. 75-76).
Two issues should be addressed before examining the
court's analysis of the consents under Arroyo:

(1) In finding a

violation of the knock-and-announce statute, did the trial court
incorrectly hold that a near thirty second waiting period between
notice and entry was not adequate? and (2) In order to resolve
the issue presented on appeal, must this Court decide, as
defendant seems to suggest, whether a violation of Utah's knockand-announce statute encompasses a fourth amendment violation or
triggers the exclusionary rule?
A.

Violation of Section 77-23-10

The officers did not have a "no-knock11 warrant under
section 77-23-10(2).

Order at 9 (R. 75). Thus, the issue is

whether the officers complied with section 77-23-10(1), which
provides that, in executing a search warrant, an officer may
forcibly enter the premises "[i]f, after notice of authority and
purpose, there is no response or he is not admitted with
reasonable promptness."8
court did not find that a pay envelope was discovered in the
apartment search, and defendant fails to show that either the
absence of such a finding or the entry of the finding that no
incriminating evidence was found is clearly erroneous. See Ashe,
745 P.2d at 1258.
8

Section 77-23-10 provides:
When asearch warrant has been issued
15

In concluding that the officers violated section 77-2310(1), the trial court made two relevant factual findings:

(1)

the officers entered defendant's residence "less than 30 seconds
after knocking," and (2) "the officers announced their identity
and intent simultaneously with their entry."

Order at 4, 9 (R.

70, 75). In short, the court found that the officers knocked and
then less than thirty seconds later entered, simultaneously
announcing their authority and purpose.

The court appears to

have relied on these two factual findings as independent bases
for its conclusion that section 77-23-10 was violated:

(1)

inadequate waiting period, and (2) improperly timed notice of
authority and purpose.
The court correctly concluded the officers violated the
statute when they announced their identity and intent
authorizing entry into any building, room,
conveyance, compartment or other enclosure,
the officer executing the warrant may use
such force as is reasonably necessary to
enter:
(1) If, after notice of his
authority and purpose, there is no
response or he is not admitted with
reasonable promptness; or
(2) Without notice of his
authority and purpose, if the
magistrate issuing the warrant
directs in the warrant that the
officer need not give notice. The
magistrate shall so direct only
upon proof, under oath, that the
object of the search may be quickly
destroyed, disposed of, or
secreted, or the physical harm may
result to any person if notice were
given.
16

simultaneously with entry, rather than before entry.
provides that entry is to occur only after
authority and purpose.

The statute

an announcement of

See, e.g.. United States v. Dicesare, 765

F.2d 890, 896 (9th Cir.) (announcing identity and purpose
simultaneously with entry violates federal knock-and-announce
statute), opinion amended, 777 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985); State v.
LaPonsie, 136 Ariz. 73, 664 P.2d 223 (Ariz. App. 1982) (virtually
simultaneous announcement and entry not sufficient); State v.
Lowrie, 12 Wash.App. 155, 528 P.2d 1010 (1974) (announcement
while knocking door down insufficient).9 The officers' error
was not egregious; they simply erred in the timing of the
required notice, not in failing to give the notice altogether.
Compare State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988) (although
officers violated statute by failing to knock or announce their
9

Although the officers may have been able to articulate a
legitimate concern for their safety when entering defendant's
apartment due to the violent nature of the crime they suspected
he had recently committed, such that the failure to announce
their authority and purpose before entry could be excused, see
State v. Ford, 310 Or. 623, 638-39, 801 P.2d 754, 763-64 (1990),
only Agent Conner testified about potential danger in making the
entry, and then only in general terms (R. 142). A more
specifically articulated concern is required. See United States
v. Nabors, 901 F.2d 1351, 1354-55 (6th Cir. 1990) (mere fact
defendant suspected of having a firearm would not be enough, but
exigent circumstances existed here, based on suspicion of drug
trafficking and probable cause defendant had an array of firearms
and routinely wore a bullet-proof vest); State v. Pelletier, 209
Conn. 564, 573-75, 552 A.2d 805, 810-11 (1989) (entry without
notice proper where defendant 24 hours earlier had been involved
in robbery-murders committed "in an especially violent manner"
and defendant believed to have a semi-automatic weapon); State v.
Ford, 310 Or. at 638-39, 801 P.2d at 763-64 (entry without notice
lawful where officers knew or had reason to believe defendant had
"five concealable firearms in his possession" and "had an
extensive criminal history" which contained "substantial evidence
of his potentially violent character").
17

authority and purpose, Court declined to order suppression of
evidence seized).
However, the court's implicit holding that a thirty
second period10 between the knock and entry was inadequate is
incorrect, and this Court, in order to provide direction to law
enforcement in future cases, should address the court's error.
Under section 77-23-10(1), an officer may forcibly
enter premises to execute a warrant if, after proper notice is
given, "there is no response or [the officer] is not admitted
with reasonable promptness."

This Court has never decided how

long an officer must wait for a response before entering, or what
period of time constitutes "reasonable promptness."

Other courts

have held that once notice is given, the officer must "wait a
reasonable period of time before he may break and enter into the
premises to be searched,"

State v. Carufel, 112 R.I. 664, 668,

314 A.2d 144, 146 (1974) (citation omitted), so that the occupant
is "'given a reasonable opportunity to surrender his privacy
voluntarily,'" People v. Abdon, 30 Cal.App.3d 972, 977, 106
Cal.Rptr. 879, 881-882 (1972) (quoting United States ex rel.
Ametrane v. Gable, 276 F. Supp. 555, 559 (E.D. Pa. 1967))
(emphasis omitted).

But see State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586, 593

n.3, 586 P.2d 671, 678 n.3 (1978) ("The 'knock and announce'
10

As previously noted, Agent Conner's testimony that
approximately thirty seconds elapsed between the officers'
initial knock on the door and their entry into defendants'
residence was the only evidence presented on that point (see n.2,
supra at 5) Accordingly, the court's finding of "less than 30
seconds" is most reasonably interpreted as less than but nearly
thirty seconds.
18

statutes do not require that police wait any appreciable time
before entering a house after they have complied with the
statute.").

A number of decisions have upheld entries where the

police have waited from ten to thirty seconds after giving
notice.

E.g. United States v. Streeter, 907 F.2d 781, 788-89

(8th Cir. 1990) (10 seconds sufficient where highly flammable and
toxic chemicals were inside and officers heard movement behind
door); United States v. DeLutis, 722 F.2d 902, 908-09 (1st Cir.
1983) (in general, 20 seconds sufficient); Irwin v. State, 415
So.2d 1181, 1183 (Ala. Crim. App.) (20 seconds sufficient), cert,
denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982); Carter v. State, 418 A.2d 989, 99394 (Del. 1980) (30 seconds sufficient).
Although it is not practicable to prescribe for all
possible scenarios an absolute minimum waiting period which
officers must observe before entering after giving notice11,
Streeter, 907 F.2d at 789, United States v. Ruminer, 786 F.2d
381, 384 (10th Cir. 1986), this Court should reject the trial
court's apparent conclusion that thirty seconds was not adequate
here.

A thirty second waiting period is within the lower limits

generally recognized by the courts.

See DeLutis, 722 F.2d at 909

(20 seconds generally accepted as a reasonable waiting period).

11

Of course, there are situations where no notice or
waiting period would be required, or where the required waiting
period would be significantly shortened due to developing
circumstances. These situations generally fall into one of the
following exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule: the
destruction-of-evidence exception, the danger-to-person
exception, and the "useless gesture" exception. See generally 2
W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 4.8 at 280-87 (1987).
19

Accordingly, in order to provide needed direction to law
enforcement, this Court should make clear that, in cases where
one of the exceptions to the knock-and-announce requirement is
not present (see n.9, supra at 17), an officer who, after giving
proper notice and before entering, waits at least twenty seconds
for a response or some affirmative indication of voluntary
admittance has complied with section 77-23-10(1).

Of course,

such a rule must be tempered by the general principle that what
is a reasonable waiting period necessarily depends on the facts
of each case.

See United States v. McConnev, 728 F.2d 1195, 1206

(9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) ("The interval of time an officer must
wait between announcement and entry depends on the circumstances
of each case."); Streeter, 907 F.2d at 789; Irwin, 415 So.2d at
1183.
B.

Fourth Amendment Violation and Exclusionary Rule
Although the officers violated section 77-23-10(1), it

is far from settled that this violation of the knock-and-announce
statute either constitutes a violation of the fourth amendment or
triggers the exclusionary rule.

Defendant argues that a

violation of the statute necessarily encompasses a fourth
amendment violation and suppression is the only remedy.
In State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988), this Court
held that a no-knock execution of a search warrant in violation
of section 77-23-10 was not a per se violation of the fourth
amendment because the defendant was not at home at the time of
the entry.

Affirming the trial court's denial of the defendant's
20

motion to suppress, the Court reasoned that "[a]lthough the[]
[officers'] unannounced entry was not authorized by the warrant,
it did not contribute appreciably to the invasion of privacy
already authorized by the warrant".

756 P.2d at 703. However,

the Court did not address the issue of whether a per se
constitutional violation occurs or whether the exclusionary rule
applies when an officer violates the knock-and-announce statute
and the defendant is on the premises.
The courts are split on whether a violation of the
knock-and-announce rule in the latter circumstance is a per se
violation of the fourth amendment.

Compare, e.g., People v.

Wolaenmuth, 69 111.2d 154, 370 N.E.2d 1067, 1072 (1977) (mere
failure of police to announce their authority and purpose is not
per se violation of fourth amendment), cert, denied, 436 U.S. 908
(1978), with United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198, 202 & n.7
(10th Cir. 1980) (violation of federal knock-and-announce statute
constitutes violation of the fourth amendment).

The United

States Supreme Court has never definitively held that compliance
with the knock-and-announce rule is required by the fourth
amendment.

See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (where a

majority of the Court did not reach a definitive conclusion as to
whether violation of a knock-and-announce statute encompasses a
fourth amendment violation).

But see United States v. Mueller,

902 F.2d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that "[s]ince Ker, most
of the circuits have followed, although with certain
embellishments, the four-Justice dissent in Ker, which contended
21

that a violation of the 'knock-and-announce' rule of [18 U.S.C.]
section 3109 should also be a violation of the fourth
amendment").

Furthermore, the courts are not in complete

agreement that suppression must be the remedy for violation of
the knock-and-announce rule.

Compare, e.g., Commonwealth v.

Morgan, 517 Pa. 93, 534 A.2d 1054, 1056 & n.2 (1987) (suggesting
that violation of Pennsylvania's knock-and-announce rule does not
necessarily require suppression), with Dicesare, 765 F.2d at 895
(violation of federal knock-and-announce statute requires
suppression).

See also Buck, 756 P.2d at 703-04 (Zimmerman, J.,

concurring) (discussing need for remedy if noncompliance with
section 77-23-10 were to become commonplace).

Compare State v.

Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Utah 1987) (concluding that although
officer acted outside of his statutory geographical authority in
an undercover purchase of narcotics, suppression of evidence
would be "a remedy out of all proportion to the benefits gained
to the end of obtaining justice while preserving individual
liberties unimpaired"); United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117
(6th Cir. 1978) (violation of nighttime search provision is
procedural and does not necessarily require suppression), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 921 (1979).
However, to resolve the suppression issue presented
here, this Court need not decide whether the violation of section
77-23-10 that occurred in this case is either of constitutional
magnitude or must be remedied by applying the exclusionary rule.
As the trial court correctly concluded, because no incriminating
22

evidence was found in the search of defendant's residence, the
only issue is whether the violation of section 77-23-10 tainted
defendant's subsequent consents to the search of his storage
unit, such that the evidence seized from that place must be
suppressed —

an issue the trial court correctly resolved in

favor of the State.

Even if it were assumed the officers'

violation of the knock-and-announce statute is the type of prior
"illegal police action" contemplated by Arroyo and its
voluntariness/police exploitation test for determining the
validity of a consent to search which follows police misconduct,
defendant's consents were valid.
C. Arroyo Analysis
Under Arroyo, the inquiry whether a consent to search
is lawfully obtained following illegal police action must focus
on two factors:

(1) whether the consent was voluntary, and (2)

whether the consent was obtained by police exploitation of the
prior illegality.

796 P.2d at 688. The trial court concluded

that both of defendant's written consents to the search of his
storage unit (State's Exs. 2-S and 5-S, copies of which are
contained in Appendix C) were voluntary and not obtained by
police exploitation of the prior illegality (i.e., the entry in
violation of section 77-23-10).

Order at 11-13 (R. 77-79).

Without referring to any standards of review, defendant asks this
Court to overturn the lower court's ruling.
Standards of Review
Before the trial court's Arroyo analysis is examined,
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the standards of review applicable to each prong of the Arroyo
test must be discussed.
"[A] consent which is not voluntarily given is
invalid."

Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688 (citations omitted).

A

totality of circumstances test applies to ascertain whether the
consent to search was in fact voluntarily given and not the
result of "duress or coercion, express or implied."
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).

Schneckloth

"'[B]oth the

characteristics of the accused and the details o f the police
conduct" are considered.

Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689 (quoting

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226). Whether a defendant voluntarily
consented is a question of fact on which the state carries the
burden of proof.

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557

(1980); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990).

Under

the great weight of authority, the state must prove voluntary
consent by a preponderance of the evidence.12
12

See, e^g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177
n.14 (1974) (where, in reviewing the voluntariness of a consent
to a warrantless search, the Court said that the "controlling
burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater
burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence"); Bouriailv
v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987) (citing Matlock for
the principle that "voluntariness of consent to search must be
shown by a preponderance of the evidence"); United States v.
Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990); People v. Harris, 199
111.App.3d 1008, 557 N.E.2d 1277, 1279 (1990)/ State v. Cress,
576 A.2d 1366, 1367 (Me. 1990); State v. O'Dell, 576 A.2d 425,
427 (R.I. 1990); People v. Henderson, 220 Cal.App.3d 1632, 1650,
270 Cal.Rptr. 248, 257 (1990). While acceptance of the
preponderance standard in this context is not universal, see 4 W.
LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.2(c) at 236-37 (1987), and the
Supreme Court has made clear that "the States are free pursuant
to their own law, to adopt a higher standard[,] [in that] [t]hey
may indeed differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values
they find at stake," Lego v. Twomev, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972),
24

The trial court's finding of voluntary consent will not
be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Webb, 790 P.2d at 82 ("We
deferentially review a trial court's finding of voluntary
consent, like other factual determinations underlying the denial
of the motion to suppress, disturbing it only if the appellant
demonstrates clear error.").

See also Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258. A

finding is clearly erroneous if "it is 'against the clear weight
that standard is consistent with this Court's adoption of a
preponderance standard in the confession context. State v.
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 890 (Utah 1989) ("State bears burden of
proving by at least a preponderance of the evidence that a
defendant's confession is voluntary").
The trial court applied a clear and convincing standard
of proof, finding the State had met this standard in proving
voluntary consent. Order at 11-13 (R. 77-79). That standard is
the one the Utah Court of Appeals appears to have adopted. See
State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (Utah App.) (following
United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1976)),
cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d
at 82; but see State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 467 n.7 (Utah App.
1991) (declining to specify what standard of proof applies),
cert, denied, No. 910340 (Utah Feb. 18, 1992). However, this
Court should make clear that a preponderance standard is
appropriate, based on the reasoning of Lego v. Twomev, 404 U.S.
at 486-89, where the Court drew clear and valid distinctions
between the question of admissibility and the question of guilt:
"Since the purpose that a voluntariness hearing is designed to
serve has nothing whatever to do with improving the reliability
of jury verdicts, we cannot accept the charge that judging the
admissibility of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence
undermines the mandate of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 []
(1970)[,] [which confirmed the fundamental right of an accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt]."
See also United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130-31 (1st
Cir. 1978) (criticizing United States v. Abbott as applying an
unduly strict standard of proof), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 958
(1979). But see State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,
(Utah 1991)
("trial court should regard with caution any claim that the
suspect 'consented'" to a search).
However, should this Court adopt a clear and convincing
standard, the trial court's finding that the State met the higher
standard is supported by the record.
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of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'"

State v.

Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 743
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)).13

And, "[i]n order to show clear

error, the appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is
insufficient to support the findings against an attack."

State

v, Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990) (footnote citation
omitted).

13

The Utah Court of Appeals has been unable to agree on the
standard of review for voluntary consent determinations. Compare
Webb, 790 P.2d at 82 (consent determination a question of fact
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard), with State v. Bobo,
803 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1990) (trial court's ultimate
determination of voluntary consent is a conclusion of law which
is reviewed de novo on appeal). See also State v. Grovier, 808
P.2d 133, 137 n.l (Utah App. 1991) (declining to follow Bobo and
applying "Utah and federal case law which views the question of
whether consent to search is 'voluntary' as a question of fact");
State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 468-69 n.8 (Utah App. 1991)
(discussing the split in panels and stating that the issue
"should be definitively determined by the Utah Supreme Court"),
cert, denied. No. 910340 (Utah Feb. 18, 1992).
This issue is easily resolved when, as in the instant
case, a challenge to a consent search is made under the fourth
amendment. The United States Supreme Court, in ruling that the
consent determination is a finding of fact rather than a
conclusion of law, Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222, 227, has in
effect construed the fourth amendment as not embracing the
consent question. Thus, insofar as Bobo stands for the
proposition that consent is a legal question under the fourth
amendment, the law which presumably applies, it is contrary to
the construction of the fourth amendment adopted by the final
arbiter of that provision. In short, given Schneckloth, a state
appellate court is not free to characterize the consent
determination as anything but a finding of fact, when the
challenge to the consent search is made under federal
constitutional law.
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Whether there has been police exploitation of the prior
illegality or, put another way, whether there was sufficient
attenuation between the illegality and the consent to search, see
Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690-91 & n.4, is also a question of fact.
United States v. Butts, 729 F.2d 1514, 1527 (5th Cir. 1984)
(Jolly, J., dissenting) ("Whether the connection between the
illegal conduct and the questioned evidence [defendant's
statements] is attenuated is largely a fact question to be
determined and evaluated in each case."), cert, denied, 469 U.S.
855 (1984); People v. Convers, 510 N.Y.S.2d 552, 554, 503 N.E.2d
108, 109-10 (N.Y. 1986) (attenuation determination reviewed under
standard that looks only to see whether there is support in the
record); People v. Williams, 8 Cal.App.3d 44, 86 Cal.Rptr. 821,
824 (1970) ("Whether or not . . . attenuation exists is a
question of fact for the trial court to resolve.").

Therefore,

the same standards of review that apply to the voluntariness
determination apply to the trial court's exploitation/attenuation
determination.
With these standards of review in mind, the trial
court's application of the Arroyo test can now be examined.
Consent
The court's finding that defendant voluntarily
consented to the search of his storage unit is supported by the
record.

In arguing that his consent was involuntary, defendant

fails to demonstrate that the court's contrary finding is clearly
erroneous (i.e., against the clear weight of the evidence).
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Furthermore, he ignores many of the specific, component factual
findings which were part of the court's finding of voluntary
consent.
As to the first consent given by defendant for the
search of the storage unit, the court found:
There can be little doubt from the
perspective of the defendant, chaos reigned
for about an hour following the forced entry
by six officers with guns drawn. Within 45
minutes, however, things began to calm. By
7:00 or 7:15 a.m., almost an hour had passed
since the forced entry and defendant had been
treated by the paramedics, was clothed and
had called his employer. What is most
persuasive, however, is the testimony of both
defendant and Agent Swehla. Just ten minutes
before defendant first consented to a search
of the storage unit, Agent Swehla read an
identical consent forirrA verbatim to
defendant. The consent form is itself clear
and unequivocal and the court has found from
the totality of the circumstances that
defendant understood the consent.15
Defendant himself testified that he was not
coerced. . . .
Order at 11-12 (R. 77-78).

The court also specifically found

14

The court's reference to an "identical consent form" is
to the forms defendant signed for the search of two automobiles
and a camper. See Order at 5 (R. 71) (State's Exs. 3-S and 4-S).
15

This consent form, like all the others, acknowledged that
(1) defendant had been informed of his constitutional right not
to have a search of the described premises conducted without a
warrant and of his right to refuse to consent to such a search;
(2) he understood he was not under arrest; (3) he understood he
could revoke the consent at any time before the search was
completed; (4) he understood that any incriminating evidence
found during the search could be used against him in court or
other proceedings; (5) he had been informed that the officers
were looking for "hazardous explosive materials and devices;" (6)
he gave the permission to search voluntarily; and (7) he had "not
been threatened either by word or action and no promises of any
sort ha[d] been made to [him]" (State's Ex. 5-S) (Appendix C ) .
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that, although an officer made the suggestion that defendant's
failure to cooperate and sign the consent form would not
ultimately prohibit a search, this suggestion was not made to
defendant by Agent Swehla, who acquired the first consent from
him.

Ld. at 5 (R. 71). It also found that prior to giving his

consent, defendant had been "informed of his constitutional right
to counsel and to remain silent."

Ibid.

Finally, the court made

clear that, in finding the State had met its burden of proving
the first consent was voluntary, the court had considered the
specific factors outlined in State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103
(Utah 1980)16, "the activities of the hour preceding the consent
and such factors as a continuously shackled defendant," and the
"statement of an officer not directly involved in acquiring the
consent suggesting a search was inevitable" —

a statement which

"did not vitiate the voluntariness of the consent" and which,
"given the court's review of Magistrate Boyce's search warrant, .
. • was true."

Id. at 12 (R. 78).

Defendant does not claim that either the finding of

16

Recognizing that to show voluntariness the prosecution is
not required to prove the defendant knew of his right to refuse
to consent, Whittenback sets out the following factors which may
demonstrate a lack of duress or coercion:
1) the absence of a claim of authority to
search by the officers; 2) the absence of an
exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a
mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the
owner of the [place to be searched]; and 5)
the absence of deception or trick on the part
of the officer.
621 P.2d at 106 (footnote citation omitted).
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voluntary consent or any of its component findings of fact are
clearly erroneous.

Rather, he simply Margue[s] selected evidence

favorable to [his] position," and asks this Court to retry the
facts —

an approach the Court has rejected as inappropriate.

Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah
1991).

Moreover, he fails to show that the trial court drew any

unreasonable inferences from the facts it found.

In short,

defendant has not carried his burden on appeal to show that the
court's finding as to defendant's first consent is clearly
erroneous.

Indeed, the court's finding of voluntary consent has

substantial support in the record.
Defendant's argument is equally deficient with respect
to his second consent to the search of the storage unit.
Regarding that consent, the court made the following pertinent
findings:

although defendant had been handcuffed throughout much

of the period following the officers' initial entry, defendant
was not handcuffed for "20 minutes to one hour at the storage
unit and in transit;" at the storage unit "Agent Conner went over
the consent form with defendant point by point before he signed
it;" "[d]efendant understood the consent and testified himself
that his signature was not coerced;" and defendant "also
understood that the form was similar to that which he previously
signed for Agent Swehla."

Order at 6 (R. 72). The court

concluded:
The same factors and evidence [that
applied to the first consent] apply to the
second consent to search the storage unit
which was granted at 11:29 a.m. At the time
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of the second consent, however, the chaos of
the initial entry was over six hours distant,
defendant had been informed of his Miranda
rights a second time and Agent Conner
reviewed anew each item on the consent form.
The court therefore concludes from a totality
of the circumstances that the State has met
its burden of proof that the second consent
to search the storage unit was knowingly and
voluntarily granted. The court makes this
conclusion after fully considering that
defendant was shackled for six hours at the
time he signed the second consent form for
the storage unit.17
Id. at 12-13 (R. 78-79).

Again, defendant does not show that

the court's finding of voluntary consent is clearly erroneous,
content simply to suggest that this Court make a different
finding on the voluntariness question.

Moreover, the record

provides substantial support for the court's finding.
In sum, in the absence of a showing that the trial
court was clearly erroneous, there is no basis for disturbing its
findings that both of defendant's consents were voluntary.
Therefore, the court's determination on the first prong of the
Arroyo test should be upheld.
Exploitation
The exploitation prong of the Arroyo test is not so
easily understood or applied.

Addressing this prong, the trial

court said:

17

In arguing both the voluntariness and exploitation prongs
of Arroyo, defendant places undue emphasis on his being
handcuffed much of the time and being continuously detained. See
Br. of Appellant at 11-14. It is well settled that handcuffs and
custody, while factors to be considered, do not themselves render
consent involuntary. State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273-74 (Utah
App. 1990); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990).
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The same evidence which persuaded this court
that each consent was knowingly and
voluntarily granted equally but independently
persuades this court that the officers did
not exploit the initial unlawful entry. The
circumstances and passage of time from the
entry to the first consent purged each of the
consents from the taint of the unauthorized
"no-knock" entry. The officers did nothing
to harken back to the entry and did not make
any further unnecessary show of force not
otherwise implicit by their presence.
Focusing solely on the second consent to
search the storage unit, the passage of time
proved to be the best antiseptic, cleansing
the second consent of any taint from the
unlawful "no-knock" entry.
Order at 13 (R. 79). Before reviewing this finding of no
exploitation, some discussion of the second prong of the Arroyo
test, and the need for this Court to clarify the operation of
that prong, is necessary.
Without explaining precisely how the exploitation
analysis is to proceed, Arroyo suggested only that the specific
inquiry is whether the consent was sufficiently "attenuated" from
the prior illegality such that the consent was not "tainted" by
that illegality.

796 P.2d at 690-91. The Court noted the Brown

v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), factors which should be
considered, .id., at 690-91 n.4, but did not make clear whether the
primary focus of the exploitation analysis is the possible effect
of the initial police misconduct on the voluntariness of the
consent or rather the police misconduct itself.

Arroyo cites

numerous cases on the issue of exploitation, ,id. at 690-91, but
does not express a preference for one of the two approaches those
cases appear to adopt.

Under one approach, voluntariness of the
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consent is the primary consideration, and if there is voluntary
consent (i.e., the consent has not been rendered involuntary by
the prior police illegality), the evidence seized pursuant to the
consent is generally admissible.

Under the other approach, the

police misconduct itself is the primary consideration.

A consent

to search that is obtained close in time and circumstance to the
police illegality, although entirely voluntary, is "tainted," and
the evidence seized pursuant to the consent is inadmissible.
For example, some of the cases cited in Arroyo discuss
the exploitation question primarily in terms of the potential
effect of the police misconduct on the voluntariness of the
consent.

See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 550

(11th Cir. 1987) ("[W]e hold that the consent was the product of
the illegal detention, and that the taint of the unreasonable
stop was not sufficiently attenuated. . . . [T]here were
insufficient intervening circumstances that might have reduced
the coercive nature of the stop and permitted the appellant to
make a voluntary decision about the consent search."); United
States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1981) ("no
intervening events or lapse of time which would show [the
defendant's] consent was 'sufficiently an act of free will to
purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion'"); State v.
Raheem, 464 So.2d 293, 298 (La. 1985) ("Under the circumstances
presented here, we cannot say that [the defendant's] consent was
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest and search to be
a product of her free will.").
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On the other hand, some of the cases mechanically apply
the exploitation analysis with no apparent concern about whether
the voluntariness of the consent has been undermined by the
police misconduct.

These cases seem to focus solely on the

police misconduct and whether it "taints" the consent such that
the evidence seized must be suppressed under the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine.

See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-

Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356, 1362 (11th Cir. 1983); People v. Odom,
83 Ill.App.3d 1022, 39 111.Dec. 406, 404 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1980).
The latter approach was followed by two panels of the
Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App.
1991), cert, pending, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah May 14, 1991),
and State v. Park, 810 P.2d 456 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 827
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), which involved consent searches after
illegal roadblock stops18.

In Sims, the panel began its

analysis by acknowledging that the defendant did not challenge
the voluntariness of his consent to the search, but that he
claimed "there was insufficient attenuation between his detention
and the consent . . . to purge the taint of the illegality of the
detention."

808 P.2d at 150.

It applied the Brown v. Illinois

18

At the time the roadblocks were set up in Sims and Park,
there was no decision from either Utah's appellate courts or the
United States Supreme Court that had directly ruled on the
legality of such roadblocks. See generally Sims, 808 P.2d at
142-50. Thus, the roadblocks could not be fairly characterized
as flagrant violations of the fourth amendment or article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution, even though the court of
appeals concluded that they violated those provisions.
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factors which Arroyo identified as pertinent to the evaluation of
the "non-exploitation or attenuation element":

"the temporal

proximity of the primary illegality and the granting of the
consent, the presence or absence of intervening circumstances,
and the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal police conduct."
Ibid.

Concluding that "the record demonstrates [the defendant's]

consent to search his vehicle was arrived at by exploitation of
the illegal roadblock," id,, at 152, the panel relied most heavily
on two factors:

(1) "the consent was obtained within minutes of

the illegal stop, and not even under our clear error standard of
review could the trial court find enough time between the stop
and the grant of consent to attenuate the relationship between
the two;" and (2) "the record reveal[ed] [no] possibility of
intervening circumstances between the illegal stop and [the
defendant's] grant of consent to the search," id. at 151. An
identical approach was followed by the Park panel in reversing
the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.
810 P.2d at 458-59.
This mechanical application of the exploitation prong,
which automatically invalidates a search and/or seizure if the
voluntary consent is closely connected in time and by
circumstance to the prior illegality (a scenario which is
frequently present in these kinds of cases), amounts to the "but
for" rule of exclusion that was rejected in Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).

See United States v.

Wellins, 654 F.2d 550, 555 (9th Cir. 1981) ("lack of significant
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intervening period of time does not, in itself, require that the
evidence be suppressed for want of sufficient attenuation").

As

stated in Arroyo, "'all evidence is [not] 'fruit of the poisonous
tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the
illegal actions of the police.'"

796 P.2d at 688 (quoting Wong

Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88) (citation omitted).

But, given Arroyo's

ambiguous discussion of the exploitation prong, it was not
unreasonable for the court of appeals to interpret Arroyo as
setting forth the mechanical rule applied in Sims and Park.

What

those cases illustrate is the need for clarification by this
Court of how the exploitation prong should be applied by the
lower courts.
A fundamental problem with Sims and Park is that they
fail to acknowledge that in Arroyo the Court remanded to the
trial court for a determination of the exploitation issue under
nearly identical facts (i.e., an illegal vehicle stop which was
followed shortly thereafter by the defendant's consent to a
search of the vehicle).

796 P.2d at 692. Had this Court

considered the close temporal proximity between the illegal stop
and the consent, coupled with the absence of any intervening
circumstances, to be dispositive of the exploitation question, as
Sims and Park concluded, it presumably would not have remanded
for a determination of that question by the trial court.

In

ordering a remand, Arroyo implicitly rejected the mechanical
approach to the exploitation analysis employed in Sims and Park.
The contrary approach to the exploitation inquiry,
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which focuses primarily on the possible effect of the police
misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent, appears to be
most consistent with Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 (1983),
identified in Arroyo as an example of the application of the
exploitation prong in a consent search case.

796 P.2d at 690.

In Rover, the police stopped the defendant at an airport based on
a drug courier profile and ultimately obtained his consent to a
search of his luggage, in which narcotics were found.19

Royer

moved to suppress the contraband seized from his luggage.

The

trial court denied the motion, ruling that Royer's consent to the
search was "freely and voluntarily" given.

460 U.S. at 495. The

intermediate appellate court of Florida reversed, holding that
Royer's detention was unlawful and that the unlawful detention
tainted Royer's consent to search.

19

Ibid.

That decision was

The Court recounted Royer's consent as follows:
[After the detectives had removed Royer to a
small room and retrieved his luggage from the
airline], Royer was asked if he would consent
to a search of the suitcases. Without orally
responding to this request, Royer produced a
key and unlocked one of the suitcases, which
one detective then opened without seeking
further assent from Royer. Marihuana was
found in that suitcase. According to
Detective Johnson, Royer stated that he did
not know the combination to the lock on the
second suitcase. When asked if he objected
to the detective opening the second suitcase,
Royer said "[n]o, go ahead," and did not
object when the detective explained that the
suitcase might have to be broken open. The
suitcase was pried open by the officers and
more marihuana was found. . . .

460 U.S. at 494-95.
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affirmed by the Supreme Court in a plurality opinion.

460 U.S.

at 493-508. Although, as noted in Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690, the
plurality never directly questioned the trial court's finding
that Royer's consent was "freely and voluntarily" given, it
nevertheless appears to have been primarily concerned with the
coercive circumstances under which the consent was obtained and
the effect those circumstances had on the voluntariness of the
consent.

This is evident from Justice Powell's concurrence, in

which he wrote:

"I agree with the plurality that . . . [the

defendant's] surrender of the luggage key to the officers cannot
be viewed as consensual."

460 U.S. at 509 (Powell, J.,

concurring).
In Arroyo, this Court rejected an exploitation analysis
that focuses solely

on voluntariness, declining to adopt the

reasoning of United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir.),
cert, denied, 479 U.S. 914 (1986).

There, the Tenth Circuit

Court of Appeals held:
[I]n a case in which evidence is obtained
pursuant to consent granted subsequent to
illegal police actions, the "exploitation"
issue under Wong Sun is resolved simply by
determining whether or not defendant's grant
of consent was voluntary under the
circumstances. . . . When defendant's grant
of consent is voluntary, then there is no
exploitation; . . . the findings of voluntary
consent and "exploitation" are mutually
exclusive.
793 F.2d at 1149 (emphasis in original).

However, the Court's

rejection of Carson must be considered in connection with its
reliance on Rover.

In this light, Arroyo is most reasonably read
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as adopting an exploitation analysis that focuses primarily, but
not solely, on the voluntariness of the consent to search.

Under

such an approach, the Brown v. Illinois factors are more easily
and logically applied.
In Brown, the Supreme Court had before it the narrow
question of whether "the Illinois courts were in error in
assuming that the Miranda warnings, by themselves, under Wong Sun
always purge the taint of an illegal arrest."

422 U.S. at 605.

Brown had been arrested without probable cause and without a
warrant; and, while in custody and after being given Miranda
warnings, he made two inculpatory statements concerning a murder.
Id. at 591, 594-95.

The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that,

although Brown's arrest was illegal, the giving of Miranda
warnings "'served to break the causal connection between the
illegal arrest and the giving of the statements, and that
defendant's act in making the statements was 'sufficiently an act
of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful
invasion.' (Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, at 486.)'"
Id. at 597 (quoting People v. Brown, 56 111.2d 312, 317, 307
N.E.2d 356, 358 (1974)).

At bottom, the state court held that

"the Miranda warnings in and of themselves broke the causal chain
so that any subsequent statement, even one induced by the
continuing effects of unconstitutional custody, was admissible so
long as, in the traditional sense, it was voluntary and not
coerced in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."
Ibid.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the
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implication of its holding in Wong Sun to the facts of Brown's
case.

Ibid.
The Court began by reviewing its holding in Wong Sun,

where the issue was "whether statements and other evidence
obtained after an illegal arrest or search should be excluded."
Id. at 597.

The statements were obtained from two defendants,

Wong Sun and Toy.

Toy's statement was obtained immediately after

he was pursued and illegally arrested by six agents.

It

apparently was a spontaneous response to a question asked him in
the frenzy of that event, and the agents apparently made no
attempt to advise him of his right to remain silent.

On the

other hand, Wong Sun's statement, also obtained after an illegal
arrest, was not given until after he was arraigned and released
on his own recognizance.

He voluntarily returned to the station

a few days after his arrest for questioning, and his statement
came after he had been advised of his right to remain silent and
to have counsel present.
in part).

Td. at 607-08 (Powell, J., concurring

Under these facts, the Wong Sun Court ruled that Toy's

statement should not have been admitted as evidence against him,
holding that "the statement did not result from 'an intervening
independent act of a free will,' and that it was not
'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of
the unlawful invasion.'"

.Id. at 598 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S.

at 486). However, with respect to Wong Sun's confession, the
Court ruled that it was admissible because "the connection
between his unlawful arrest and the statement 'had become so
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attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'"

Ibid, (quoting Wong Sun,

371 U.S. at 491) (citation omitted).
The Brown Court then made clear that "[t]he
exclusionary rule . . . was applied in Wong Sun primarily
protect Fourth Amendment rights.

to

Protection of the Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination was not the Court's
paramount concern there."

Id.

at 599 (emphasis in original).

In

short, the Court's foremost concern was to apply the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule where it would serve its primary
purpose of deterring illegal conduct by the police —

thus the

different rulings regarding Toy's statement and Wong Sun's
statement.

As Justice Powell admonished in his concurring

opinion, "the Wong Sun inquiry always should be conducted with
the deterrent purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
sharply in focus."

Id. at 612 (Powell, J., concurring in part)

(citation omitted).
It was against this backdrop that the Brown Court
rejected the per se rule of admission adopted by the Illinois
courts and also declined to adopt an alternative per se or "but
for" rule of exclusion.

Instead, the Court concluded that "[t]he

question whether a confession is the product of a free will under
Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case[,] [and] no
single fact is dispositive."

.Id. at 603.

It made clear that the

presence of Miranda warnings does not control the determination
of whether a confession that has followed a fourth amendment
violation is admissible.

While that factor is important in
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determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of
the fourth amendment violation, other relevant factors are to be
considered, including:

"[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest

and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances,
and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official
misconduct."

Id. at 603-04 (footnotes and citations omitted).

It is with this understanding of Wong Sun and Brown
that Arroyo must be read.

As previously discussed, Arroyo

specifically relied on Rover as an example of the application of
the exploitation analysis to a case where evidence was seized
pursuant to a consent to search which followed an initial fourth
amendment violation.

The Rover plurality's primary concern

appears to have been the voluntariness of the consent to search.
Thus, Arroyo's reference to the Brown factors, coupled with its
reliance on Rover and its rejection of Carson, is most reasonably
interpreted as an adoption of an exploitation analysis which (1)
focuses primarily, but not solely, on the voluntariness of the
consent, (2) applies the Brown factors to determine whether the
voluntariness of the consent was in fact affected by the prior
police illegality, and (3) considers whether the police
misconduct was sufficiently flagrant or purposeful that the
evidence should be excluded even though the consent to search was
entirely voluntary.

The inquiry would proceed as follows:

(1)

Was the the consent in fact rendered involuntary by the temporal
proximity between the fourth amendment violation and the consent,
the absence of any intervening circumstances, or flagrant police
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misconduct?20 (2) Even if it is determined that the consent was
voluntary after consideration of the possible effect of all three
Brown factors, was the police misconduct purposeful or flagrant
such that the evidence should be excluded in order to deter that
level of police misconduct?

With respect to this second

question, if there is a purposeful or flagrant violation of the
fourth amendment, then the first two Brown factors (temporal
proximity and intervening circumstances) are considered to
determine if there is sufficient "attenuation" to remove the
"taint" from the flagrant violation which would naturally flow
under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.
In his concurring opinion in Brown, Justice Powell
illustrated this process in the confession context:
I would require the clearest indication of
attenuation in cases in which official
conduct was flagrantly abusive of Fourth
Amendment r i g h t s . . . . In such cases the
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule is
most likely to be effective, and the
corresponding mandate to preserve judicial
integrity most clearly demands that the
fruits of the official misconduct be denied.
I thus would require some demonstrably
effective break in the chain of events
leading from the illegal arrest to the
statement, such as actual consultation with
counsel or the accused's presentation before
a magistrate for a determination of probable
cause, before the taint can be deemed
removed.

20

Consideration of voluntariness under the exploitation
prong of the Arroyo test may overlap to some degree with the
voluntariness inquiry which has already occurred under the first
prong of that test. However, under the exploitation prong,
particular attention is paid to the police illegality and its
possible effect on voluntariness.
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422 U.S. at 610-11 (citations omitted).

A similar analysis would

be made in the consent to search case, and the first two Brown
factors would determine whether the consent was sufficientlyattenuated in terms of time and circumstance to be free of the
taint of the flagrant police misconduct.21
This approach recognizes both that "in some
circumstances strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule imposes greater cost on legitimate demands of
law enforcement than can be justified by the rule's deterrent
purposes," and that in cases of flagrant police misconduct "the
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule is most likely to be
effective."

Brown, 422 U.S. at 608-09, 611 (Powell, J.,

concurring in part).
The Court should clarify Arroyo in the foregoing
manner.

The exploitation prong will then be understandable and

more easily applied.
Under the proposed clarification, the trial court's
exploitation/attenuation finding should be upheld.

In fact, the

court essentially applied Arroyo in the manner suggested.
Apparently proceeding with the assumption that the violation of
section 77-23-10 was not flagrant (a correct assumption, in that
there was no indication the officers purposefully violated the
21

For example, had the officers' conduct in Sims actually
been flagrant, which it was not, the court of appeals would have
been correct in excluding the evidence on the basis that there
was no significant lapse of time or intervening circumstances
between the consent to search and the illegality. But in the
absence of flagrant conduct, the approach followed in Sims was
incorrect for the reasons previously discussed.
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statute), the court focused primarily on the voluntariness of
defendant's consent in light of the prior illegality.

This is

obvious from the court's statement that "[t]he same evidence
which persuaded th[e] court that each consent was knowingly and
voluntarily granted equally but independently persuades th[e]
court that the officers did not exploit the initial unlawful
entry."

Order at 13 (R. 79). The court applied the first two

Brown factors, temporal proximity and intervening circumstances,
by specifically considering the changed circumstances and the
passage of time between the unlawful entry and the two consents.
Eighty-five minutes passed between the officers' initial entry
and defendant's signing of the first consent form for the search
of his storage unit, and the situation within his apartment had
calmed significantly from the "chaos" associated with the entry.
Defendant's signing of the second consent form at the storage
unit, over five hours after the initial entry and under
circumstances where he was not handcuffed and was allowed to move
around (R. 128-29), was even more attenuated from the entry.

See

Order at 13.
In sum, the trial court found that the passage of time
and the changed circumstances significantly reduced the
possibility that the officers' unlawful entry undermined
defendant's free will in giving his consent.

This approach is

entirely consistent with several cases cited with apparent
approval in Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 691, and which were noted above:
United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d at 550 ("[W]e hold that the
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consent was the product of the illegal detention, and that the
taint of the unreasonable stop was not sufficiently attenuated. .
. . [T]here were insufficient intervening circumstances that
might have reduced the coercive nature of the stop and permitted
the appellant to make a voluntary decision about the consent
search."); United States v. Taheri, 648 F.2d at 601 ("no
intervening events or lapse of time which would show [the
defendant's] consent was 'sufficiently an act of free will to
purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion'"); State v.
Raheem, 464 So.2d at 298 ("Under the circumstances presented
here, we cannot say that [the defendant's] consent was
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest and search to be
a product of her free will.").

In that the court's finding of

attenuation is supported by the record and defendant has not
shown clear error, that finding should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
suppress.
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Fill
,t!ST COURT
Thira Judicial District

9 1991
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^SA^VLAKECDUNiy
Dep jty C I :

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CIVIL NO.

911900907

STEVEN DOUGLAS THURMAN,
Defendant,

Defendant

Steven

Douglas

Thurman

has moved

to

suppress

evidence resulting from searches conducted under a warrant and
written

consents.

Additionally,

he

statements he made during the searches.

seeks

to

suppress

Many of the pertinent

facts are uncontested but some are necessarily part of the fact
finding

duties

of

the

court.

This

Memorandum

Decision

constitutes the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of
law.

I.

FACTS

The defendant is charged with a capital homicide and two
related

felonies.

The

Information

alleges

that

defendant

caused the death of Adam Cook by means of a bomb which was

JC€
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detonated on the night of May 15, 1991. On the night following
the bombing incident, U.S. Magistrate Ronald Boyce issued a
warrant to search defendant's apartment.

The application for

the search warrant requested authorization to enter defendant's
apartment without giving notice ("no-knock" entry) and at any
time

of

the day

or

night.

The warrant

issued,

however,

restricted the search to the hours between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00
p.m.

and did not authorize a "no-knock" entry.

The basis for the warrant was the affidavit of Roderic J.
Conner, a Special Agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco &
Firearms

("ATF").

All

the

information

contained

in

the

affidavit appears to have been developed in the days and hours
following the May 15 bombing.
Assuming

the accuracy

of the Conner

affidavit

and the

hearsay statements therein, the following facts supporting the
issuance of a warrant were submitted to Magistrate Boyce:

A

bomb was placed in an automobile belonging to Howard Cook and
was detonated on May 15, 1991, injuring Mr. Cook's son, Adam.
Mr. Cook had been having an affair with defendant's former
wife, Wendy Thurman.
after

the Thurman

divorce.

The affair spanned the period before and
divorce

but was not the

cause

of the

As recent as May 13, Cook had spent the night at

PAGE THREE
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The defendant was aware of the

affair between Mr. Cook and his former wife.

The defendant

reported this affair to Mr. Cook's then wife and asked her if
she intended to allow Mr. Cook to continue to reside in the
Cook house.

While defendant had made no threats directly to

his former wife, on at least one occasion several months before
the bombing

incident he sat in his car in the early morning

hours outside his former wife's apartment

and

former wife and Mr. Cook returning from a date.

observed

his

Defendant had

expressed his anger toward and hatred for his former wife and
indicated he had hired a private investigator to watch her and
Mr. Cook.

On the morning of May 14, a male caller to Metz

Bakery, an establishment where both Mr. Cook and defendant's
former wife were employed, stated that there was a bomb in one
of

the

trucks.

The

Salt

Lake

investigated but found no bomb.

County

Sheriff's

Office

On the day of the bombing, May

15, Mr. Cook's automobile was parked in the Metz Bakery parking
lot from 6:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.

At the time of the bombing,

Mr. Cook's automobile was parked in front of the Richard Craig
residence located at 5740 South 665 West in Murray.

A neighbor

of the Craig's observed a small two-door vehicle leave the area
at a high rate of speed and with its lights out.

The Affidavit
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does not, however, specify the date or time when the neighbor
made
Monza.
At

this

observation.

The

defendant

drives

a

Chevrolet

(Affidavit of Roderic J. Conner, paras. 2-4, 6-10, 12).
6:14

a.m.

on May

17, 1991, the

day

following

the

issuance of the warrant and two days following the bombing,
seven law enforcement officers executed the warrant.

Six of

the officers forced their way into defendant's apartment with
weapons drawn less than 30 seconds after knocking.

The ATF

agent in charge of entry testified that the officers announced
their

identity

and

intent

simultaneously

with

their

entry.

Defendant was in bed, asleep, naked and offering no resistance
when he was subdued and handcuffed by the officers.

In the

process, defendant was cut on the nose and attended
paramedics

on

the

scene.

The

evidence

does

not

to by

indicate

whether the paramedics were summoned out of concern for the
officers'

liability

or

the

defendant's

well-being.

The

paramedics treated defendant and he was allowed to dress at
some time before

7:30

a.m.

and perhaps

as early

as

6:30.

Defendant was initially informed of his rights in accordance
with the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
soon after the officers' entry but before he was treated by the
paramedics and allowed to dress.

0C070
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At 7:30 a.m. defendant signed two forms granting consent to
search two automobiles and a camper.

ATF Agent Robert Swehla

read the consent form verbatim to defendant.

As the search at

defendant's apartment proceeded, the officers became aware of a
storage unit which defendant rented.

At 7:40 a.m. defendant

signed another consent form authorizing a generalized search of
the

storage

unit.

Defendant

consents before signing.

fully

evidence

whether

an

the

three

His own testimony indicated that he

was not compelled or coerced to sign.
the

understood

officer

There is a conflict in

suggested

that

defendant's

failure to cooperate and sign the consent would not ultimately
prohibit

a

search.

The

court

specifically

finds

that

an

officer made that suggestion but that it was not Agent Swehla.
It was Swehla, however, who was in charge of acquiring these
consents.

It should be noted that the consents were signed

75-85 minutes

following

entry

and

after

defendant

dressed,

called his employer, was treated by the paramedics and informed
of his constitutional

right to counsel and right to remain

silent.
Between approximately 8:30 and 9:30 a.m., an officer again
informed defendant of his rights under the Miranda decision.
At 11:00 a.m. defendant accompanied the officers to the storage

00071
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unit and the defendant again signed a general consent to search
the storage unit at 11:29 a.m.

ATF Agent Conner went over the

consent form with defendant point by point before he signed the
form.

Defendant understood the consent and testified himself

that his signature was not coerced.

He also understood that

the form was similar to that which he previously signed for
Agent Swehla.
While the search of the storage unit proceeded at about
12:30 or 1:00 p.m., ATF Agent Swehla invited defendant into a
mobile command unit to talk.

It was at this time defendant

made the statements which he now seeks to suppress.
was not given any
silent

or

right

Defendant

further warnings of his right to remain

to

counsel.

Immediately

after

making

the

subject statements, defendant did invoke his right to counsel.
The questioning then ceased.
Defendant was handcuffed throughout the various searches
with the exception of a total of 20 minutes to one hour at the
storage

unit

and

in

transit.

arrested until 2:30 p.m.

Defendant

was

not

formally

There can be no doubt, however, that

defendant was in custody since 6:14 a.m.

00073
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II.

SEARCH WARRANT

This court's obligation in reviewing the search warrant is
merely to insure the Magistrate had an appropriate basis for
determining that probable cause existed for the issuance of the
warrant.
great

In conducting this review, the court should render

deference

to

the

Magistrate's

determination.

The

Magistrate's decision is not a theoretical or technical one but
instead a practical, common sense determination considering the
totality of the circumstances specified in the affidavit.

It

is the Magistrate's obligation to determine whether there is a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found at the specified location.
127,

129

State v. Hansen, 732 P. 2d

(Utah 1987); State v. Miller, 740 P.2d

1363, 1365

(Utah App. 1987); State v. Strombera. 783 P.2d 54, 56, 57 (Utah
App. 1989).
In reviewing the affidavit presented to Magistrate Boyce,
it can be fairly inferred that the defendant had a motivation
to harm Mr. Cook and had demonstrated an intense interest in
knowing Mr. Cook's comings and goings.

Mr. Cook's employer had

been the subject of a bomb threat just one day before the
bombing

in

question.

This

information

was

sufficient

to

justify the Magistrate's determination that there was a fair

3:073
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probability evidence of the crime could be located in defendant
Thurman's apartment.
Defendant's challenge to the search warrant
based

on

a

affidavit
question

claim

that

is stale.
of

staleness

the

factual

in

the

Most all of the cases addressing

the

approach

it

basis

is in part

from

recited

the

perspective

of

whether there is a sufficient showing that the evidence can
still be located at the site to be searched.

See, State v.

Hansen, supra; State v. Strombercr. supra; State v. Anderton,
668

P.2d

1258

(Utah

1983).

In

this

case,

however,

the

challenge of staleness is not directed at the fruits of the
search but
search.

instead

at the underlying

justification

for the

Merely because much of the information recited in the

supporting affidavit disclosed matters occurring months before
is of no great significance.

Such facts were for the purpose

of showing that defendant had motive and opportunity to commit
the crime and that his apartment was thus an appropriate place
to search.

The alleged stale allegations were not for the

purpose of suggesting that evidence of the crime could still be
located at the apartment.
As noted, the allegedly stale facts were acted upon by law
enforcement

within

days

after

the

facts

came

to

their

STATE V. THURMAN
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Moreover, law enforcement acted with some dispatch

after the May 15 bombing to effect the search.
issued

one

day

after

the

incident

and

The warrant was

executed

within

15

minutes of the earliest time authorized by the warrant itself.
The affidavit supporting the warrant suggested the likelihood
that

relevant

(Affidavit

evidence

of

consequence,

Roderic

the

would
J.

alleged

still

Conner,

be

in

paras.

staleness

of

the

14,

apartment.

16).

information

As

does

a
not

suggest the search would be fruitless and does not thereby
undermine the probable cause upon which the warrant was based.
The propriety
offer

absolute

executed.
executed
Magistrate

The
as

if

Boyce

of the search warrant, however, does not

sanctuary
evidence
it
did

was
not

for

the

manner

establishes
a

that

"no-knock"

authorize

in
the

warrant

such

which

it

was

warrant

was

even

though

a warrant.

As a

practical matter, the officers made a mere perfunctory knock
and seconds later made a forced entry.

It was only upon entry

that the officers announced their identity and purpose.

There

was not only insufficient compliance with Section 77-23-10(1),
Utah

Code Ann., requiring

notice of authority

and purpose,

there was not even an attempt by the officers to announce their
identity and purpose before forcing entry.
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It appears that the officers took it upon themselves to
execute the lawful warrant in an unlawful manner.
officers may
Magistrate

well

Boyce

have

had

considered

concern
such

for

concerns

their

While the
own

safety,

expressed

in the

affidavit of Agent Conner but rejected them by not authorizing
the requested "no-knockfl warrant.

(Affidavit of Agent Conner,

paras. 17 and 18).
Having determined that the search warrant was lawful but
the manner of its execution unlawful, it is necessary for this
court to determine the consequences of the latter.

If the

search of the apartment pursuant to the warrant had produced
relevant evidence, one decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
would justify suppression of the evidence.
P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991).

State v. Rowe, 806

In this particular case, however,

the search of the apartment was fruitless.

Relevant evidence

was acquired only from a search of the storage area for which
there was a purported consent but no warrant.

This court then

must analyze the consequences of the unlawful execution of a
lawful search warrant in the context of the consents to search
the storage area rather than in the context of the lawful
issuance of the warrant itself.

:*:Q7G
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>NSENTS T O SEARCH
Because the evidence sought t, be suppressed did

••* result

from the search authorized by the wrirvvmt, tin- St,

as the

burden

-^H convincing

consents

search

which

yielded

the

evidence

subject

that

the

evidence

knowingly and voluntarily granted,

were

-._ w h e t h e r

the

f>^e court m u s t consider generally the
totality of the circumstances and specifically certain
specified by the Utah Supreme Court,
P.2d

factors

State v. Whittenback.

621

) .
There can ; c: little doubt that from the perspective ot

d e f e n d a n t , chaos reigned
entry

by

six

I i i.l ',,1

officers

with

h o w e v e r , things began to calm.
h o u r had passed
treated

by

employer.

si^

Agent

guns

drawn.

Swehl<

Within

J ?; m i n u t e s ,

/ : ± D a.m

-

I ost an

^ defendant had
was

clothed

W h a t is m o s t persuasive

first

following the forced

h

paramedics,

of b o t h defendant
defendant

I. •

and

identical

had

called

lowever,

a::i Jd A• 3• = 1 t S1 > • e ]

consented

of

consent

defendant.
and the court has found from the totality

been
his

estimony

iRt f<=> m i n u t e s

search

e

the

storage

t um

clear

and

:f the

before
unit,
1 to

unequivocal
circumstances
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understood

the

testified he was not coerced.

consent.

Defendant

himself

The court concludes that the

State has met its burden of proving that the first consent to
search the storage unit was knowingly and voluntarily granted.
In

drawing

this

conclusion,

the

court

considered

the

totality of the circumstances, including the specific factors
referenced in State v. Whittenback, the activities of the hour
preceding

the

consent

shackled defendant.

and

such

factors

as

a

continuously

Additionally, the statement of an officer

not directly involved in acquiring the consent suggesting that
a search was inevitable did not vitiate the voluntariness of
the consent.

This statement is but a piece of evidence to be

considered in the totality.

Furthermore, given this court's

review of Magistrate Boyce's search warrant, the statement was
true.

See State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1274, n.7 (Utah App.

1990).
The same factors and evidence apply to the second consent
to search the storage unit which was granted at 11:29 a.m.

At

the time of the second consent, however, the chaos of the
initial entry was over six hours distant, defendant had been
informed of his Miranda rights a second time and Agent Conner
reviewed

anew

each

item

on

the

consent

form.

The

court

:*sQ78
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therefore concludes from

*

:nces that

tl,'1 Male lias met Its burden of proof that the second consent
to

search

granted.

the

storage

±n&

c

considerina that- t
hours at

;. :

,.

knowingly

and

in, lusion

voluntar i 1 ,
after

fully

lefendant was essentially shackled for six
\* signed the second consent form

storage unit.
The Utah Supreme Court decision in State v. Arroyo, 796
P. 2d 684
whether

(Utah 1990)

requires this court

mi1 cut

fithn

initial unlawful entry.

u ,v, nuLcuneu

by

exploitation

The same evidence which persuaded this

court that each consent was knowingly and
equally

l""il

independent I y

officers

did

not

circumstances
conse ^

r

exploit

persuades

the

this

initial

.tur

unlawfu

that
— •• -

passage OJ. time

the
The

firQt

the second consent purged each

consents from the taint of the unauthorized "no-knock" entry.
The officers did nothing to harken t

'

u

unnecessary show ^
implici

their presence.

Focusing

consent in search the storage unit

in

,,|.| ,<f ,...d did

force not otherwise
solely

on the second

|»(issaye of time proved

antiseptic, cleansing the second consent of any
taint from the unlawful "no-knock" entry.

0CC7
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DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS AND PROLONGED DETENTION

Defendant claims that he should have been given his Miranda
warnings anew just prior to Agent Swehla's questioning which
began about 12:30 or 1:00 p.m.

Defendant was told

of his

rights two times, the last occurring about four hours before
the questioning but over two hours after the initial entry.
These warnings

remained

sufficiently

prominent

to

defendant

that he interrupted the questioning and invoked his right to
counsel.

Furthermore,

the

same

evidence

supporting

the

voluntariness of the second consent to search the storage area
similarly establishes that defendant's statements were not the
product

of

the

initial,

unlawful

entry.

The

court

thus

concludes that the State has met its burden in establishing
that defendant's statements were knowingly and voluntarily made.
Defendant's

final

claim

is

that

defendant's

prolonged

detention constituted an arrest without probable cause.

This

court has found that defendant was seized in the sense that
from

and

after

Correspondingly,

6:14
the

a.m.
court's

he

was

not

free

to

leave.

determination

that

the

search

warrant was premised on facts establishing a fair probability
that evidence of the crime would be found necessarily means

JCQ-:
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tha

thp officers had an articulable suspicion that defendant

was

responsible

for

the

justified
complete.

Defendant's

bombing.

The

t

unti1

pre-arrest

officer111™"
al1

detention,

were

thus

searches

were

then,

while

lengthy, was justified.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant
ji

is den
Dated this

oppress

/

day of October, 1991.

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

"

St'
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the

foregoing Memorandum

following, this

9

Decision

and

Order,

to the

day of October, 1991:

Ernie Jones
Richard MacDougall
Deputy County Attorneys
Attorneys for Plaintiff
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Robert Van Sciver
Attorney for Defendant
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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APPENDIX B

AFFIDAVIT OF BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO. AND FIREARMS
SPECIAL AGENT. RQDERIC J, CONNER.

X, Roderic J. Conner, Special Agent with the Bureau __
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), having been duiv sworn,
depose and say:
3
I have been a Special Agent with ATF since September 24,
1989.
That as a result of my employment with ATF I have
successfully completed the required training courses at the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. That during
my employment I am familiar with the Federal Firearms and Explosive
laws and have conducted prior investigations concluding in the
conviction of defendants. That prior to my employment with ATF I
was a police officer with the West Linn, Oregon, Police Department
for six and one half years.
2.
That on May 14, 1991, at about 8:20 a.m. Debbi Hale, a
receptionist at Metz Bakery, while at work received a "bomb threat"
telephone call in which the male caller said to "evacuate
immediately, there1 s a bomb in the back of one of the trucks, this
isn't a joke" and then hung up the phone.
Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Deputies assisted the Metz Bakery management by checking
the Metz premises. A bomb or explosive device was not discovered.
That on May 15, 1991, at approximately 9:35 p.m. a pipe
bomb exploded inside a 1985 Toyota Landcruiser owned by Howard
Cook.
The vehicle was parked in front of the Richard Craig
residence, 5740 South 665 West, Murray, Utah. At the time of the
explosion the vehicle was occupied by the eleven year old son of
Howard Cook, Adam Cook. Adam Cook sustained serious injuries to
his head, in fact, a AA size battery was lodged behind Adam's eye
requiring emergency surgery to save his life.
4.
^*^w wn nay x6, 1993^ Detective Jeff Anderson (Murray,
Utah, Police Department) and I interviewed Howard Cook at the
University of Utah Hospital Emergency Room regarding the bombing.
Mr. Cook was asked about his day's activities and told his us his
schedule for May
1991. Mr. Cook said that he went to work at
Metz Bakery at approximately 6:00 a.m. He was at work until 4:00
p.m. He believed that his car was locked and parked in the Metz
Bakery parking lot the entire day. After work, Mr. Cook said that
he went to his residence and worked in his yard until approximately
5:50 p.m. At that time, Mr. Cook said that he went to his exw i f e ^ home (approx. 2700 East 4300 South) to pick up his two sons,
Geoffery and Adam, to spend the evening with him. After leaving
his ex-wife's home they went to Wendy's Hamburgers (approx. 5900
South State) and ordered their meal through the drive-up window.
Mr. Cook said that he then took Adam to Boy Scouts at Viewmont
Elementary School (approx 5700 South 720 West) . Mr Cook was asked
by the Scout Master to go down by the Jordan River to see if there
was another boy scout from the Troop that might have received wrong

information about the meeting. Mr. Cook and his son, Geoffery,
went down to the river but were unable to locate the other scout.
They then went to the Richard Craig residence (5740 South 665 West)
at approximately 7:30 p.m. as was his normal activity on Wednesday
nights while waiting for Adam to return from his Boy Scout meeting.
Mr. Cook said that he left the Landcruiser unlocked in front of
the Craig residence and took the keys inside with him. Mr. Cook
said that he remained at the Craig's until Adam returned from Boy
Scouts. When Adam arrived at the Craig1 s, Mr. Cook and Geoffery
began to prepare to leave. While they were in the house Adam ran
out to the Landcruiser to wait for them. Mr. Cook was
at the front
1
door when he saw Adam get in the front driver
s
side
of the
vehicle. Mr. Cook said that he saw the driver1 s side door open,
a few seconds later he heard the horn and a "split second" later
the bomb exploded.
5.
Mr. Cook described the explosion by saying that he saw
a bright white light and heard a "huge" explosion. He looked
outside and saw Adam hunched over the front seat of the vehicle.
6.
Mr. Cook was asked if there was anyone who would want to
do him harm. Mr. Cook said that he had been having an affair with
Wendy Thurman who worked with him at Metz1 Bakery. Mr. Cook said
that he had continued his relationship with Wendy after she got a
divorce and had even spent the night of May 13, 1991, at Wendy1 s
residence. Mr. Cook said that Wendy's ex-husband, Steve Thurman,
knew of their affair; however, the affair was not the cause of the
divorce.
7.
Mr. Cook said that Steve Thurman drives an early 1980's
Chevrolet Monza, cream or beige in color, with a square back. Jeff
Anderson conducted a search of the Utah Motor Vehicle Registration
record for Steve Thurman and found that he had registered a 1975
Chevrolet Monza with license plate # THURM.
8.
On May 16, 1991, Jeff Anderson and I interviewed Marian
Cook, Howard Cook's ex-wife. Ms. Cook said that the affair between
Howard and Wendy was a contributing factor to their divorce in
January. Ms. Cook said that she had been called by Steve Thurman.
She said that Thurman had told her that Howard and Wendy were
having an affair and he wanted to know if Marian was going to kick
Howard out of the house.
9.
On May 16, 1991, Jeff Anderson and I interviewed Wendy
Thurman.
She said that Steve would not talk to her after the
divorce and had not made any threats against her. Wendy said that
she and Howard came to her house at about 1:30 a.m. after a date
several months ago and saw Steve Thurman in his car parked near the
apartment watching them.
Wendy said that Steve's father had
committed suicide several years ago and his mother had terminal
cancer. Wendy also said that Steve had been laid off from his job
at Hercules a few months ago and he was having problems finding a
job.

10. On May 16, 1991 r Jeff Anderson and I interviewed Linda
Mae Bird, the Aunt of Wendy Thurman, who said that she had received
a telephone call from Steve Thurman about six months ago and he
told her he had hired a private investigator to watch Howard and
Wendy. Mrs. Bird said that Steve was extremely angry at Wendy
because of the divorce and said that he hates Wendy for it. Mrs.
Bird said that Steve knew where Howard parked his Landcruiser when
he was visiting Wendy at her residence and he had photos of them
together.
11. On May 16, 1991, Jeff Anderson and I contacted the
managers office at the Tanglewood Apartments and determined that
Steve Thurman was renting their apartment at 3843 West 3500 South,
Apartment "H", and he had been the sole occupant of that apartment
since last year.
12. On May 16, 1991, Detective Hall of Murray, Utah Police
who told me that he interviewed Diane Burbidge who is a neighbor
of the Craig's. She said that she saw a small 2 door vehicle
leaving the area Eastbound at a high rate of speed with its lights
out.
I
13. On May 16, 1991, Jerry Taylor, ATF Explosives Enforcement
Officer examined the remains of the device recovered from in and
around the Toyota Landcruiser and determined that the device
consisted of batteries, remote control receiver, a servo-mechanism
that was modified to serve as a switch, a cardboard box which
concealed a pipe bomb that was wrapped with nails.
14. Based on my experience, knowledge, and training, I have
found that individuals that manufacture and or position improvised
bombs have these components and materials to construct improvised
bombs in their residence, vehicles, workshops, or garage. The
materials include: receipts for bomb components, actual components
such as batteries, explosives, pipe bomb parts, tape, books, video
tapes or manuals describing the assembly of improvised bombs, tools
used to manufacture improvised bombs, and items described in
paragraph 13 of this affidavit.
15. Based on my experience, knowledge, and training, I have
reason to believe that Steve Thurman has and is currently violating
firearms laws, to wit: 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) POSSESSION OF
UNREGISTERED DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES, and these offenses have been and
are being committed on the property and dwelling specifically
described as 3843 Rockwood Way #H, West Valley City, Utah, and
within the Central Division of the District of Utah, and in a
vehicle registered to Steve Thurman which is described as a 1975
Chevrolet Monza, Utah license #THURM.
16. Also based upon my experience, knowledge, and training,
I have reason to believe that on the property described in
paragraphs 13 and 14 of this affidavit there will be found property
that constitutes evidence or commission of a crime; fruits of crime
or things otherwise criminally possessed; property designed or

intended for use or which is or has been used as a means of
committing a criminal offense, to wit: items mentioned in
paragraphs 13 and 14 of this affidavit.
17. Also based upon my experience, knowledge, and training,
those individuals required to execute a warrant involving the
search of explosives and their precursor materials will be in
danger if Agents and Officers are required to announce their
authority and purpose before executing this warrant as required by
18 U.S.C. § 3109. Authority is therefore sought from this Court
to break open any outer or inner doors or windows without giving
notice of authority on the properties described in paragraph 15 of
this affidavit in order to execute this search warrant.
18. Finally, based upon my experience, knowledge, and
training, the materials are hazardous to public safety, a threat
to residents in the adjoining area, and the possibility that the
suspect has animosity towards other victims possibly designated as
targets of additional bombings. Authority is therefore sought from
this Court to execute this warrant at any time in the day or night.
DATED this

day of May, 1991.

Roderic J. Conner, Special Agent
BATF
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS

RONALD N. BOYCE
United States Magistrate Judge

APPROVED:
MARK K. VINCENT, Special
Assistant U.S. Attorney

day of May, 1991.
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DISTRICT OF

UTAH

In the Matter of the Search of
(Nam*, aoarm or orw( dascnouon of pcraon or prewiy to M Mtrcrwsi

The property of 3843 West 3500 South #H
SEARCH W A R R A N T
West Valley City, Utah, and
The property of a 1975 Chevrolet Monza CASE NUMBER:
with Utah: license plate #Thurm.

TO:

Poffo-rir J . Conner

and any Authorized Officer of the United States

Affidavit(s) having been made before me by

s»A, Ropder^c J . Conner

who has reason to

believe that Q on the person of or Q on the premises known as <n*me. Description *nafor location*

3843 West 3500 South #H
West Valley City, Utah
and
1975 Chevrolet Monza with Utah license #THURM.
in the

CENTRAL DIVISION

District of

UTAH

there is now

concealed a certain person or property, namely (describe the oersoncr property)

See Attachment "A", which is attached hereto and incorporated herein bv re£<

I am satisfied that the affidavit(s) and any recorded testimony establish probable cause to believe that the person
or property so described is now concealed on the person or premises above-described and establish grounds for
/ t h e issuance of.this warrant.
7 YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to search on or before

May 2 3 ,

1991
Date

¥ (not to exceed 10 days) the person or place named above for the person or property specified, serving this warrant •
^ and making the search jfojgfece^^
(at any time in the day or night as ! find
' reasonable cause has been established) and if the person or property be found there to seize same, leaving a copy
of this warrant and receipt for the person or property taken, and prepare a written inventory of the person or propyl erty seized and promptly return this warrant to
P O N A L D N- BOYCE
as required by law.
u.s.juoQe©rM«9,»tr«tt
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S a l t Kake C i t y .

Utah

City ana Slate

V
Pnn*1H N, Bovr-g . US Magistrate Judge
Name ana Title of Judicial Officer

'Signature of Judicial Officer
'Signature

ATTACHMENT A
Explosive materials, that is, gunpowder, model rocket igniters or
motors, and commercial packaging for the explosive materials. Receipts
or other documents related to the purchase of the explosive materials;
tools, pipe nipples, pipe end caps, electrical wiring and connectors,
packaging or duct tape and sundry items used in the fabrication of a
destructive device.

Bomb components to include batteries, switches,

remote control receiver and transmitter, servo mechanism, nails,
cardboard box and receipts for these items. Drawings, books, manuals,
video tapes, diagrams or other forms of instructions relating to the
fabrication of destructive devices. Photographs of destructive devices,
their components, and the process involved in the manufacture of bombs.
Equipment to be used for the manufacturing of components for destructive
devices.

Partially assembled or assembled destructive devices. Any

documentation or information pertaining to the storage, possession,
and/or manufacturing of destructive devices.

APPENDIX C

CONSENT TO SEARCH PREMISES
J Location
j
^T»*+<~A ^^rr j?//
]
/ / / £
rf^&xJ
j
**it0t/+L£j err**/'

]Date, T
] 5A7/f/
]Time
1 /A'27f4w

]
1
]
1

I, ^T&V&O l^ou^tArS "TVwie^AO y having been informed of my
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l right not to have a search made of the
premises described below without a search warrant, and
of my r i g h t to refuse to consent to such a search, hereby
authorize
^ACrr~

<U*^S>

€Z^u^r^ £^4A

4^T->

(Titles and Names of Agents)
to conduct a complete search of my premises located at
(Address of Premises to be Searcnea)
and c o n s i s t i n g of
^7Yl/*J
Jf Cf&t/ C3a
/ 7*^ -r^* cA^T*
,
^
„
(General Description or Property)
I understand that I am not under arrest and I understand
that I can revoke t h i s consent at anytime before the
search has been completed.
I also understand that any
incriminating evidence that may be found during this
search may be used %against me in court or other proceedings.
The agents named above have informed me that their reason
for wishing to search these premises i s £~**~ &\j>o&*cA c {*

This written permission i s being given by me to the abovenamed agents v o l u n t a r i l y .
I have not been threatened
either by word or action and no promises of any sort
have been made to me.

f-/7-«r
o r i z m g Signature

Date

ST-'**'
Dare

UJN&JS.Nr TU SEARCH P R E M I S E S

J Location

#/*

1Date

/

]

/,*

]Time

]

1 £7*^

1

I,
, having been informed of my
constitutional right not to have a search made of the
premises described below without a search warrant, and
of my right to refuse to consent to such a search, hereby
authorize

(Titles and Names of Agents)
to conduct a complete search of my premises located at
(Address of Premises to be Searched)
and consisting of /£ /Le_^r~/*L- /JAJJT
£ ~/f
LSKJKJZ^ L^/^SJEJ
^§°*1
(General Description of Property) s/*u*£ /iosr^STC^
I understand that I am not under arrest and I understand
that I can revoke this consent at anytime before the
search has been completed. I also understand that any
incriminating evidence that may be found during this
search may be used .against me in court or other proceedings.
The agents named above have informed me that their reason
for wishing to search these premises is 7~Q
^ac^^r^L
/>tf?Z-r?j!U2

0U£

jEvLpLQZ/uJF

'S44Qr£vUALX.

/?X//3 / ^ / C

ArujCi&S

This written permission is being given by me to the abovenamed agents voluntarily. I have not been threatened
either by word or action and no promises of any sort
have been made to me.

n
Cl**-K^

Authorizmg

'Uslsinn^Signature

3V7-9 L
Date

£~-/7-?/
Date

Witness

